Major Car Accident Verdict in the NJ State Supreme Court won by Franklin
Solomon of Weitz & Luxenberg
Christina DiProspero v. Barbara J. Penn, et
al. (A-66-03)
This is part 3 of major car collision verdict won by Franklin Solomon of Weitz & Luxenberg.
III.
The issue before us is whether the Legislature intended the Oswin serious life impact test to apply to AICRA ’slimitation on lawsuit threshold. Plaintiff contends that the intent of the Legislature is found in the plain language ofthe threshold statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 8(a), and the absence of a serious life impact standard in that statute. Plaintiff ’sstrongest argument may lie in a simple logical deduction. The Legislature knew of the Oswin standard; the AICRAthreshold does not contain that standard; therefore, the Legislature must have intended to exclude the Oswinstandard. Plaintiff bolsters that argument by highlighting that Oswin, supra, construed the 1988 verbal threshold, astatute significantly different from AICRA ’s limitation on lawsuit threshold. She points out that the limitation onlawsuit threshold was but one part of a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at lowering insurance rates. She urgesthis Court not to superimpose a judicial standard, unintended by the Legislature, onto that scheme.
Defendants submit that the Legislature necessarily intended this Court to carry over the serious life impact test fromthe verbal threshold to the current lawsuit threshold. Defendants forcefully argue that the singular purpose of AICRAwas to reduce insurance rates. By defendants ’ l ogic, discarding Oswin ’s serious life impact standard would guaranteemore successful pain and suffering claims, which in turn would lead to increases in insurance premiums, a result theLegislature could not have wanted. Plaintiff and defendants array the extrinsic evidence to their respectiveadvantages, reaching diametrically opposed conclusions. With those arguments in mind, we proceed to survey thelimitation on lawsuit threshold and its origins in search of legislative intent.
In determining whether Oswin ’s serious life impact standard survived the passage of AICRA, we must look to theLegislature ’s intent in fashioning AICRA ’s limitation on lawsuit threshold. The Legislature ’s intent is the paramountgoal when interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language. Frugis v.Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003). We ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance,Lane v. Holderman, 23 N.J. 304, 313 (1957), and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense tothe legislation as a whole, Chasin v. Montclair State Univ., 159 N.J. 418, 426- 27 (1999). It is not the function of thisCourt to “rewrite a plainly- written enactment of the Legislature []or presume that the Legislature intended somethingother than that expressed by way of the plain language. ” O ’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002). We cannot “write in an additional qualification which the Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own enactment, ” Crasterv. Bd. of Comm ’rs of Newark, 9 N.J. 225, 230 (1952), or “engage in conjecture or surmise which will circumventthe plain meaning of the act, ” In re Closing of Jamesburg High School, 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980). “Our duty is toconstrue and apply the statute as enacted. ” Ibid.
A court should not “resort to extrinsic interpretative aids ” when “the statutory language is clear and unambiguous,and susceptible to only one interpretation . . . . ” Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const., 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004) (internalquotations omitted). On the other hand, if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than oneplausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, “including legislative history, committee reports, andcontemporaneous construction. ” Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75 (2004) (internal quotationsomitted). We may also resort to extrinsic evidence if a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if theoverall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language. See Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392- 93 (2001).
Our analysis, therefore, begins with the plain language of the statute. Miah v. Ahmed, 179 N.J. 511, 520 (2004). Thelanguage of the limitation on lawsuit threshold requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant caused “a bodily injurywhich results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fractures; loss ofa fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring ordisfigurement. ” N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 8(a). In this case, plaintiff has alleged a permanent injury. The statute provides that “[a]n injury shall be considered permanent when the body part or organ, or both, has not healed to function normallyand will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment. ” Ibid. The statutory language places no burdenon plaintiff other than to prove that the injury meets one of the threshold categories.
The Legislature did not include a serious life impact requirement in the text of N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 8(a) as an addedcondition to vaulting the lawsuit threshold. Ordinarily, we are enjoined from presuming that the Legislature intendeda result different from the wording of the statute or from adding a qualification that has been omitted from thestatute. We typically would not presume that after identifying precisely the types of injuries that must be proven tovault the threshold, the Legislature left for the judiciary to impose an additional hurdle for the plaintiff to clear for anactionable claim. In light of the seemingly clear and unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 8(a), we could bringour analysis to a conclusion. We recognize, however, that we cannot ignore the unique historical background ofAICRA and the prior judicial construction of a predecessor statute ? the 1988 verbal threshold.
By adopting the reasoning of James, supra, and Rios, supra, the Appellate Division in this case found, despite theplain language of the statute, a legislative intent to transpose Oswin ’s serious life impact standard from the verbalthreshold onto AICRA. The Appellate Division also found that dispensing with the serious life impact standard isinconsistent with AICRA ’s legislative declarations and findings, its legislative history, and its cost- cuttingobjectives. 8 We, therefore, will look to the available extrinsic aids to see whether they point to an interpretationdifferent from the clear language of the statute. Specifically, we will examine relevant canons of statutoryconstruction, AICRA ’s preamble, the Sponsors ’ Statement to the bill, the Governor ’s conditional veto of AICRA,and the policy considerations undergirding the legislation.
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Part 2
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Part 5 - Sec D
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Major Car Accident Verdict
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