Major Car Accident Verdict in the NJ State Supreme Court won by Franklin Solomon of Weitz & Luxenberg
Christina DiProspero v. Barbara J. Penn, et al. (A-66-03)

Argued November 29, 2004 -- Decided June 14, 2005

ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.

The Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA) provides policyholders with the choice of lower premium payments in exchange for limiting their right to sue for noneconomic damages. That option, the "limitation on lawsuit" threshold, restricts an accident victim covered by the policy from suing for noneconomic damages unless the victim suffers a bodily injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury other than scarring or disfigurement. The "verbal" threshold, the predecessor to the limitation on lawsuit threshold, required the accident victim to prove that her injury satisfied one of nine statutory categories in order to qualify for recovery of noneconomic damages. In Oswin v. Shaw, (Oswin), the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that under the verbal threshold, in addition to proving that her injury fit within one of the nine categories, the victim had to prove that she suffered a serious life impact. AICRA's limitation on lawsuit threshold does not contain language requiring that an accident victim prove that the injury caused a serious life impact. This appeal addresses whether Oswin's serious life impact standard applies to AICRA's limitation on lawsuit threshold.

On November 30, 1999, at the Route 73 traffic circle in Berlin, Barbara Penn failed to observe a "yield" sign and crashed into a car operated by plaintiff Christina DiProspero. As a result of the accident, the twenty-oneyear- old DiProspero developed back and neck pain. DiProspero received chiropractic and medical treatment for two years until her insurance carrier stopped paying for the visits.

DiProspero filed a lawsuit seeking damages for, among other things, pain and suffering. DiProspero was covered by a no fault insurance policy subject to the limitation on lawsuit threshold under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). DiProspero claimed that she suffered permanent injuries. As required by the statute, DiProspero submitted certifications by her doctors attesting to the permanency of her injuries The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that there was no evidence that DiProspero's injuries had a serious impact on her life. With one judge dissenting, the Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment. DiProspero appealed as of right to this Court.

HELD: The plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) does not contain a serious life impact standard. Nothing in AICRA's preamble, its legislative history, or its policy objectives suggests that the Legislature intended this Court to write in that standard. The Appellate Division judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. The issue before us is whether the Legislature intended the Oswin "serious life impact" test to apply to AICRA's limitation on lawsuit threshold. We must look to the Legislature's intent in fashioning AICRA's limitation on lawsuit threshold. (pp. 17-19)
2. Our analysis begins with the plain language of the statute. The language of the limitation on lawsuit threshold requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant caused a bodily injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. In this case, DiProspero has alleged a permanent injury. The statutory language places no burden on plaintiff other than to prove that the injury meets one of the threshold categories. Given the unique historical background of AICRA and the prior judicial construction of a predecessor statute – the 1988 verbal threshold, we will also examine relevant canons of statutory construction, AICRA's preamble, the Sponsors' Statement to the bill, the Governor's conditional veto of AICRA, and the policy considerations undergirding the legislation to see whether they point to an interpretation different from the clear language of the statute. (pp. 20-22)
3. The Legislature's explicit incorporation of one of Oswin's holdings (the objective medical evidence standard) into AICRA strongly implies that it consciously chose not to incorporate another of Oswin's holdings (the serious life impact standard). (p. 24)
4. A court may turn to a statute's preamble as an aid in determining legislative intent. We find that the preamble's language, which speaks in the disjunctive of non-serious or non-permanent injuries, is merely descriptive of the six statutorily defined threshold categories. We cannot find a suggestion in the statute or its history that the Legislature did not regard the threshold injuries to be serious injuries. The logical conclusion is that the Legislature created those threshold categories for the purposes of denominating six classes of serious injuries. We cannot conclude that the Legislature excluded the Oswin serious life impact standard from the limitation on lawsuit threshold with the intention of inserting it through an oblique reference in the preamble. (pp. 25-28)
5. The Sponsor's Statement sheds no light on this issue. The Sponsor's Statement is a useful interpretative aid only if it assists in understanding the Legislature's intent. We cannot discern the Legislature's intent from the Sponsors' Statement or conclude that the Legislature intended to adopt the Oswin standard through statutory silence. (pp. 29-35)
6. A Governor's conditional veto of a bill may be considered in determining legislative intent, and may be strong evidence of that intent when the veto directly affects that part of the legislation to be construed. The Governor's commentary suggests that she considered both permanent injuries and displaced fractures to be serious injuries under the new, improved threshold. The Governor referred to Oswin in her message, but only to make an unrelated point concerning Florida law. The Governor's awareness of Oswin, and her failure to reference the serious life impact test strongly imply that she did not expect that Oswin's extra-statutory standard would apply to AICRA. The Governor's conditional veto does not indicate in any way that the serious life impact standard survived the passage of AICRA. (pp. 35-37)
7. We address the argument that the Legislature must have intended to retain the serious life impact standard because one of AICRA's paramount goals was to reduce the cost of automobile insurance. We disagree with that narrow assessment of the limitation on lawsuit threshold in relation to the legislative goals in AICRA. AICRA is a detailed and comprehensive statute that seeks to contain costs in multiple ways. The new limitation on lawsuit threshold was but one means of stabilizing and reducing costs. The Legislature chose to effectuate cost-cutting savings by placing specific restrictions on the right to sue. Those restrictions are set forth in the statutory language of the new threshold. (pp. 38-39)
8. The plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) does not contain a serious life impact standard. Nothing in AICRA's preamble, its legislative history, or its policy objectives suggests that the Legislature intended this Court to write in that standard. We will not torture the legislative history in this case to create an ambiguity in an otherwise clear statute. (pp. 40-41)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED .

JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO filed a separate CONCURRING opinion. If the Legislature intended that AICRA include Oswin's serious life impact requirement, it can amend N.J.S.A. 39:6A:8; if the Legislature did not intend to transplant Oswin into AICRA, our decision today implements that legislative mandate; in either event, the issue now lies where it properly belongs: before the Legislature.

CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, ZAZZALI and WALLACE join in JUSTICE ALBIN's opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO filed a separate concurring opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA did not participate.

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