Major Car Accident Verdict in the NJ State Supreme Court won by Franklin Solomon of Weitz & Luxenberg
Christina DiProspero v. Barbara J. Penn, et al. (A-66-03)

This is part 5 of major car collision verdict won by Franklin Solomon of Weitz & Luxenberg.

V.

Section B.

The statements of a bill ’s sponsors can be a helpful tool in understanding legislative intent; nevertheless, suchextrinsic evidence has limitations. Deaney v. Linen Thread Co., 19 N.J. 578, 584- 85 (1955). Although statements ofa bill ’s sponsor may give insight into legislative purpose, such statements also may represent the viewpoint of justone person, or a small group of lawmakers. A sponsor ’s statement may also be “contradictory, ambiguous orotherwise without substantial probative value in determining legislative meaning. ” Id. at 585. Therefore, as with allextrinsic aids enlisted to divine legislative intent, a court must proceed with caution and exercise “consideredjudgment ” in determining the weight that should be accorded to a sponsor ’s statement. Ibid.

Defendants concentrate on the last sentence of a paragraph in the Sponsors ’ Statement that addresses the lawsuitthreshold.

That sentence reads: “No provision in this bill is intended to repeal otherwise applicable case law. ” Sponsors ’Statement to Senate Bill No. 3, at 59 (Apr. 2, 1998) (L. 1998, c. 21), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/9899/Bills/s0500/ 3_i2.pdf . ¹⁰ Plaintiff and defendants hotly dispute the significance ofthat sentence. Defendants reason that the Legislature intended this Court ’s judicial construction of the 1988 verbalthreshold in Oswin, supra, to apply to the limitation on lawsuit threshold in AICRA. Conversely, plaintiff argues thatOswin ’s serious life impact standard is not relevant to the completely overhauled threshold in AICRA.

The one sentence quoted above from the Sponsors ’ Statement must be viewed as part of a larger paragraphdiscussing the amendments to the lawsuit threshold:

[I]n order to further limit the numberof lawsuits filed and thereby reducepremiums for bodily injury coverage,thebill completely eliminates the existingverbal threshold and substitutes a new verbal threshold which is intendedto eliminate some of the lawsuits for minor injuries, including soft tissue injuries,which are neither serious norpermanent.The new threshold would permit suits in theevent of death, dismemberment, significant disfigurement orsignificant scarring, displaced fractures, loss of a fetus, or permanent injuries other than significant disfigurementor significant scarring if the injury is permanent to the extent that the body part or organ system has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment. Certification by a licensed treating physician that the body part or organ system has not healed to function normally and will not heal tofunction normally would be necessary before suit was filed. The certification would have to be based on objectiveclinical evidence which would include medical testing. Fraudulent certification by a physician could be a crime ofthe fourth degree. No provision in this bill is intended to repeal otherwise applicable case law.

[Ibid. (emphasis added).]

The paragraph as a whole makes it clear that the sponsors intended to replace the verbal threshold as it had existed atthe time of Oswin, supra, with a completely new threshold.

The textual differences between New Jersey ’s old and new threshold statutes render questionable any suppositionthat the Legislature intended Oswin ’s serious life impact standard to be “otherwise applicable case law. ” Four of thenine verbal threshold categories in the 1988 threshold were eliminated in AICRA and replaced by just one categoryaddressing permanent injuries. One of the eliminated categories of the verbal threshold allowed a lawsuit for painand suffering damages if the plaintiff proved “a medically determined injury or impairment of a non- permanentnature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute thatperson ’s usual and customary daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following theoccurrence of the injury or impairment. ” L. 1988, c. 119, § 6. That more subjective standard, now gone, arguablywas a significant spur for the conception of the serious life impact standard. There are other notable distinctionsbetween the two statutes. Unlike the 1988 threshold, which allowed general fractures automatically to vault thethreshold, AICRA allowed only displaced fractures to do so. AICRA also added significant scarring as a specificground for seeking pain and suffering damages. All in all, AICRA ’s threshold categories have fewer subjectivecharacteristics than the 1988 threshold, with AICRA specifically requiring a threshold- vaulting injury to be provenby “objective clinical evidence. ” N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 8(a).

As mentioned earlier, the 1988 verbal threshold was patterned after New York law. The Joint Committee onAutomobile Insurance Reform that drafted the bill that became AICRA acknowledged that the source of thelimitation on lawsuit threshold was Florida law. Deliberations with regard to automobile insurance reform:Committee Meeting of the Joint Committee on Automobile Insurance Reform, Leg. 208, at 1- 2 (N.J. March 30,1998) (L. 1998, c. 21), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/Pubhear/ 033098lb.PDF. At the JointCommittee ’s meeting on March 30, 1998, in a colloquy between Assembly Speaker Jack Collins and SenatorRichard J. Codey, the two legislators recognized that the proposed limitation on lawsuit threshold was “essentially ”the comparable Florida law, except that New Jersey ’s version had “teeth behind it, ” i.e., criminal penalties. ¹¹ Ibid.

The Florida threshold states that a plaintiff can recover pain and suffering damages provided:

the injury or disease consists in whole orin part of:

(a) Significant and permanent loss of animportant bodily function.

(b) Permanent injury within a reasonabledegree of medical probability, other thanscarring or disfigurement.

(c) Significant and permanent scarring ordisfigurement.

(d) Death.

[Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.737(2).]

Category (b) of the Florida threshold is identical to AICRA ’s category six threshold. In other respects, the twostatutes are similar, except that the Florida threshold has only four categories with no separate category for loss of afetus or displaced fractures.

In Oswin, supra, the Court ’s rationale for incorporating the serious life impact test into the New Jersey no faultinsurance law was due in part to a comparison to New York ’s lawsuit threshold. 129 N.J. at 318. In looking toFlorida ’s threshold on which AICRA is modeled, we note that that threshold has not been construed by the Floridacourts to require a plaintiff to prove a serious life impact in addition to one of the statutorily defined thresholdcategories. See, e.g., Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So.2d 12, 16, 18 (Fla. 1982). Although we do not find the followingcanon of construction controlling in this case, we note that “[a] legislative enactment patterned after a statute ofanother state is ordinarily adopted with the prior constructions placed on it by the highest court of the parentjurisdiction. ” Oswin, supra, 129 N.J. at 309 (quoting Van Horn v. William Blanchard Co., 88 N.J. 91, 97 (1981)).

The Sponsors ’ Statement is a useful interpretative aid only if it assists in understanding the Legislature ’s intent. Here,at best, the contested sentence is ambiguous because of the difficulty in determining what case law remains relevantto a significantly altered statute. On the other hand, AICRA did take into account that in breaking new ground, oldlaw would have to give way. Speaking to that particular issue, AICRA provided that “[a]ll laws or parts of lawswhich are inconsistent with the provisions of this act are repealed and superseded to the extent of suchinconsistency. ” N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 17. We need not decide whether the Oswin serious life impact standard is in conflictwith AICRA. We cannot, however, discern the Legislature ’s intent from the Sponsors ’ Statement or conclude that theLegislature intended to adopt the Oswin standard through statutory silence.

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