PSI Energy v. Roberts Mesothelioma Case: Can PSI Rely on the Merrill Theory?

Read the analysis of the Opinion in PSI Energy v. Roberts, in which the discussion of whether PSI can rely on the theory argued in Merrill. Roberts, an insulator by trade, was exposed to asbestos in his workplace, and was ultimately diagnosed with mesothelioma.

PSI cannot continue to rely on what might have been a reasonable expectation at the outset where activities inconsistent with that expectation continued for a number of years.

As noted above, PSI’s corporate representative, Hank Hammond, testified that he frequently saw ACandS’s insulators performing work at the PSI plants in the 1960’s and 1970’s. He never saw the ACandS employees taking any precautions to protect themselves from breathing the asbestos insulation.

Hammond also recalled occasions where senior members of PSI’s management were present while contractors from ACandS did insulation work. Had Knauf known that Merrill and others were walking on the skylights, Knauf would not have been protected from liability by the expectation that they would not do so.

Consequently, the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to determine under Section 343A that PSI should have anticipated the harm. Thus, PSI’s arguments regarding Section 343A fail for two reasons:

(1) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the danger was not known or obvious to Roberts; and (2) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that PSI should have anticipated the harm.

In summary, this case emphasizes the importance of our standard of review. As noted above, “[i]f there is relevant evidence which supports the verdict, then the motion may not properly be granted because evidence which supports the verdict is sufficient evidence, and the final determination is left to the fact finder.” Huff, 421-422, 363 N.E.2d at 990. As our supreme court recently noted in Smith:

Because we must look only to the evidence and the reasonable inferences most favorable to the plaintiff as a non-moving party, and because the motion for judgment on the evidence is proper only where there is no substantial evidence supporting an essential issue in the case, we decline to reverse the trial court.

The interpretation of the evidence, with the necessary assessments of weight and credibility, was properly left to the sound judgment of the jury.

Smith, 796 N.E.2d at 246. When the evidence is interpreted in a light most favorable to Robertses, it is clear that there was evidence supporting the essential elements of the Robertses’ premises liability theory.

Thus, the trial court did not err by denying PSI’s motions for judgment on the evidence or motion to correct error on the Robertses’ premises liability theory. See, e.g., id. (holding that the trial court did not err by denying a motion for judgment on the evidence).

Courtesy of the Indiana Court of Appeals and the State of Indiana

Other helpful links:

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